Tashkent: Central Asia's largest wind power project, with a one-gigawatt capacity, quietly came online earlier this year. Built by state-owned China Energy Engineering Group (CEEC) and financed with European debt, the Bash-Dzhankeldy project in Uzbekistan represents a new model for international cooperation under China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This development also raises questions for Brussels about who receives credit when the EU funds the bill.
According to Global Voices, CEEC has explicitly framed this project as a BRI flagship, uniting Saudi Vision 2030 with China's infrastructure-building ambitions. The wind farms were promoted in a state-media livestream, highlighting the collaboration between China and Saudi Arabia. The project is backed by two syndicated loans arranged by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), each comprising a USD 150 million loan on the EBRD's account, supplemented by B-loans syndicated to other lenders, including French and German state funds.
While EU institutions hold a 54 percent stake in the EBRD, which operates independently, it is often associated with the EU's Global Gateway initiative. This association allows EU-funded projects to be delivered by Chinese firms, a situation that highlights the limits of Brussels' influence in strategic projects outside the EU.
In the last five years, Chinese firms have won 13 percent of EBRD public-sector contracts by value, compared to 35 percent for EU contractors across its 38 operating countries. Chinese companies have also secured over EUR 1 billion worth of contracts for European Investment Bank (EIB)-funded projects in non-EU countries, such as Georgia, Senegal, and Tunisia. Elena Kiryakova from the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) notes a shift towards China co-financing projects with multilateral development banks, reflecting a change in the BRI's financial model.
Yunis Sharifi of the China Global South Project observes that host countries prefer investments over debt, leading to increased equity participation from Chinese firms and more international collaboration. This approach aligns with China's strategy of third-party market cooperation, aimed at reducing risk.
In Uzbekistan, the BRI's flagship equity vehicle, the Silk Road Fund, owns a 49 percent stake in ACWA Power's RenewCo platform. This gives it exposure to all post-2019 Saudi solar and wind assets. As of July 2024, state-owned China Southern Power Grid holds a 35 percent stake in the Bash-Dhankedly project. Naser al-Tamimi of the Global Institute for Strategic Research highlights clean energy as a key component of China-Saudi cooperation, aligning with Riyadh's Vision 2030 and Beijing's green Belt and Road ambitions.
Since 2019, Uzbekistan has signed 26 power-purchase agreements for solar and wind projects, aiming for a 40 percent share of renewables in electricity generation by 2030. ACWA Power and Masdar, a firm from the UAE, have won 19 of these projects, underscoring their dominance in Uzbekistan's renewable energy sector.
While China's involvement in projects funded by European public finance has been substantial, efforts to level the playing field for European finance outside the EU remain limited. According to Ghiretti at RAND Europe, the EU has begun to address the strategic importance of public procurement but faces challenges in dealing with funding and participation in projects in third countries.
Phil Cole from WindEurope expressed concerns over European funding for Chinese-made turbines, noting the potential impact on Europe's wind industry. The cooperation between Gulf, China, and Europe is also evident in Africa, as seen in a 1.1 GW wind project in Egypt led by ACWA Power and HAU Energy, backed by a USD 700 million debt facility led by the EBRD and other European institutions.
This complex web of multilateral cooperation under the BRI allows China to mitigate risks and maintain its firms' involvement, benefiting host countries through the combination of Chinese engineering and European finance. However, for Brussels, the gains are less clear, as this cooperation challenges the narrative of competition promoted by the Global Gateway initiative.
